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This thesis explores the costs and benefits of the Buy American Act (BAA).
The BAA requires a domestic preference for all Federal Government purchases.
The thesis uses accepted economic analysis on the gains from international trade to
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In an era of shrinking defense budgets, unprecedented peacetime military
alliances, and the ever-increasing globalization of economies through free trade
agreements, the U.S. Government cannot afford to cling blindly to the protectionist
legislation of a bygone era. Established in 1933, the Buy American Act created a
"domestic preference" in the procurement of goods and services for public
agencies. Throughout its the 65-year-history, the law has seen periods of
relaxation and amplification, with revisions to the Act inherently tied to times of
economic crisis. Buy-national policies typically derive their support from the
common belief that preferential treatment for domestic suppliers will ensure
prosperity for the U.S. economy. By their very nature, protectionist policies
increase prices and introduce marketplace inefficiencies that result in higher costs
for the consumer and fewer overall goods purchased.
The discussion over the utility of the Buy American Act is typical of the
debate over any economic program. The Government must concern itself with the
cost-effective use of public funds, while "promoting the general welfare" by
stimulating domestic economic growth with the award of potentially lucrative
Government purchase contracts.
In his initiatives to reform the DoD acquisition process, Former Secretary
of Defense William Perry continually encouraged the acquisition community to
adopt the "best practices" of industry, and make DoD a "smart customer" in a
fiscally restrained environment. As the Department of Defense (DoD) searches for
more efficient ways to use its resources, it must look externally to the Buy
American Act and the restrictions that the Act imposes on defense spending. The
Act and its associated economic goals directly inhibit DoD's efforts to become a
sophisti-cated customer and adopt "the best practices" of industry.
The DoD and Defense ministries from other North Atlantic Treaty
Organizations (NATO) nations could capitalize on the free trade momentum
gained by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General
Agreement on trade and Tariffs (GATT), by working to reduce the impact of the
buy-national policies on weapon systems procurements. By altering or eliminating
buy-national practices, NATO members could realize the benefits of the "Law of
Comparative Advantage" and maximize their buying potential.
B. OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the current relevance of the Buy
American Act. Established in 1933 to shield U.S. industry from the effects of
international competition, the Act still survives today, although it is waived
regularly, and invoked in an inconsistent manner. The objective of this thesis is to
identify and analyze potential changes in the Buy American Act that can benefit
Department of Defense acquisitions as well as those of other NATO nations. The
research includes an in-depth study of the origins of this legislation, an analysis of
trends in current defense-related procurement spending, and a cost-benefit analysis
of maintaining the current policy.
This research provides policy makers with a reference for discussion of the
costs and benefits associated maintaining the Buy American Act in its current
form. This research could indicate potential changes to the Act that would allow
DoD to capitalize on the economic benefits of pursing free trade.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Research Question: What are the costs and benefits of upholding




What are the origins of the Buy American Act?
2. To what extent has the defense procurement budget declined?
3. What are the measures of costs and benefits?
4. Do the benefits of the Buy American Act exceed its costs?
5. What aspects of the Buy American Act could be modified to
appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of maintaining the
policy?
D. METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis includes:
1. A literature search of books, magazine articles, and other library
information resources.
2. Research on the established economic theory on foreign trade,
tariffs, and quotas and the law of comparative advantage.
3. A baseline assessment of DoD procurement budgets over the last 20
years.
4. Research on economic supply and demand elasticity data on DoD-
related raw materials whose trade is restricted by the Buy American
Act.
5. An economic model illustrating the effect of tariffs (or quotas) on
price and consumption of goods when they are used.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH
Chapter II. History/Background of the Buy American Act
This chapter explores the history of the Buy American Act and its inherent
tie to times of economic crises. The chapter includes a review of the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Buy American Act, as well as the
history of subsequent amendments to the Act. A detailed look at the current
version of the law frames the Chapter V discussion of any future changes to the
Buy American Act.
Chapter III. Analysis of DoD's Procurement Budgets
This Chapter contains a baseline assessment of DoD procurement budgets
over the last 20 years. The chapter presents current trends in the allocation of
Department of Defense funds.
Chapter IV. Economic Theory and Cost-Benefit Analysis
This Chapter contains a review of economic theory on quotas, tariffs, and
international trade. An illustration of the impact of tariffs on a defense-related
good ties the economic theory to the Buy American Act
Chapter V. Analysis
This chapter establishes the metrics for weighing costs and benefits ofBuy
American Act. A cost-benefit analysis of maintaining protectionist legislation will
conclude this chapter.
Chapter VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
This Chapter includes a discussion of the current application of the law, as
well as possible changes to the Buy American Act that reflect the political and
economic realities of today.
F. SCOPE OF THE THFSIS
The scope of the thesis includes: (1) a review of the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the Buy American Act, as well as the history of
subsequent amendments to the Act, (2) a study of Department of Defense (DoD)
procurement budgets for the last 20 years, (3) a review of economic theory on
quotas, tariffs, and international trade, (4) an example of DoD-relevant goods and
the costs and benefits of maintaining quotas and tariffs on for defense related
materiel, and (5) a discussion of possible changes to the Buy American Act that
would reflect the political and economic realities of today.
II. BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF THE BUY AMERICAN ACT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the history of the Buy American Act and its inherent
tie to times of economic crises. The chapter includes a review of the
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Buy American Act, as well as the
history of subsequent amendments to the Act. A detailed look at the current
version of the law frames the Chapter V discussion of possible future changes to
the Buy American Act.
The Buy American Act, and its subsequent revisions are historically
associated with times of U.S. economic crisis. During these times, our
traditionally American support for an open and competitive marketplace gives way
to the social and political desire to find sources of blame for our economic woes.
(Gerber, 1975) It was within this type of political environment that the Buy
American Act first gained its support.
B. A RISE IN PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT
In the early years of the great depression, a spirit of protectionism had taken
hold in Congress. Concern for the dwindling American workforce was foremost
on the minds of American politicians as unemployment levels approached twenty-
five percent. (Goehle, 1989, p. 11) The political resurgence of an American
isolationist philosophy inflamed this protectionist attitude. (Gerber, 1975, p. 6)
Political support for American buy-domestic policies increased in response to
implementation of protectionist policies by other Governments, specifically Great
Britain. The British Government began the dispute by placing 'buy-British'
clauses in all public purchase and construction contracts. (Sherman, 1981, p. 265)
A protectionist spirit also absorbed U.S. lawmakers as Congress passed the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, establishing the highest tariff levels in U.S. history.
(Goehle, 1989, p. 10)
C. LEGISLATIVE DEBATE AND ENACTMENT
The precursor to the Buy American Act was first introduced during
Congressional discussion of the Army's procurement budget in 1932. The result
was an amendment to the Appropriations Bill that restricted War Department
procurements to the purchase of only American-made products. (Sherman, 1981,
p. 265) This legislative precedent continued into 1933 when Congress considered
applying 'buy-American' restrictions to all Federal agency purchases.
During Congressional debate, Senator Hiram Johnson of California voiced
concerns that heavy equipment purchases needed for completion of the Hoover
Dam might go to German firms if Congress did not intervene. Senator
Vandenburg of Michigan summed up Congressional sentiment by saying "The
American treasury is not the world's community chest." (Pomeranz, 1982, pp.
131-132) At the forefront of the buy-domestic movement were the electrical
equipment and steel industries which lobbied extensively for the passage of the
Act. (Goehle, 1989, p. 11) The protectionist cause gained further momentum
when supporters entered an article from The Saturday Evening Post into the
Congressional Record . The article suggested that support for American products
was a matter of "national pride." Congress was promoting public sentiment that
held the belief that being a "good" American meant buying only American-made
products. (Gerber, 1975, p. 4)
On March 3, 1933, the Buy American Act passed as Public Law 428.
(Sherman, 1981, p. 265) It passed as an attachment to the Treasury and Post
Office Appropriation bill for Fiscal Year (FY) 1934. The law officially
established a policy of 'domestic preference' in the procurement of materials for
public agencies. President Hoover's approval was assured, given his stated belief
that the War Department (and all other Federal agencies) was (were) obligated to
show a preference for domestic materials. The result was a reduced "competitive
marketplace for Federal procurement activities." (Gerber, 1975, p. 6)
D. THE SCOPE OF THE BUY AMERICAN ACT
The Buy American Act has five major sections. The first three sections
were part of the original legislation of 1933. The fourth section was added in 1949
to clarify congressional intent. The fifth part is a result of Executive Order 10582,
added in 1954, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
1. The Original Legislation of 1933
a. Section One
This section requires the procurement of American materials and
manufactured items for public use. Exceptions to this general rule allow the
procurement of foreign materials if:
• The procurement of domestic materials is inconsistent with public
interest,
• The cost of domestic materials is determined to be unreasonable,
• The item is for use outside the United States, or
• The domestic materials are not available in sufficient commercial
quantities and of satisfactory quality.
Section one establishes the agency head as the decision maker on
issues of 'public interest' and 'cost reasonableness,' as well as on matters of
'sufficient quantity' and 'satisfactory quality.' (U.S. Code Title 41, Section 10a)
Although the initial legislation lacked a precise method for
detennining issues of cost reasonableness, the Treasury Department issued
guidance in 1934, establishing a 'rule of thumb' for procurement officials of all
agencies. The directive stated that prices for domestic goods could exceed foreign
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goods by twenty-five percent before they should be considered unreasonable.
(Pomeranz, 1982, p. 134)
b. Section Two
This section requires the use of American materials in all
construction, alteration, and repair work, on public buildings or public work.
Curiously, this section contains the only reference to a penalty (contractor
debarment for three years) for violation of the Act. This section also reasserts the
agency head as the decision-making authority on all matters of cost reasonableness
and weighing public interest. (U.S. Code Title 41, Section 10b)
c. Section Three
This section defines the terms used in the first two sections.
Specifically it defines "United States" as the U.S. and its territories, and it also
defines the terms 'public building,' 'public use,' and 'public work.' (U.S. Code
Title 41, Section 10c)
These three sections represent the original version of the Buy
American Act. Although Congress has substantially modified the scope of the
law, the original Buy-American language, definitions and exemptions still serve as
the core of Part 25 (Foreign Acquisition) of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR.)
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2. Modifications to the Buy American Act
a. Section Four
Section Four was added to the Act in 1949 to provide clarification of
the original congressional intent for the law. The section reiterates that the use of
American materials is a requirement unless the agency head determines that the
use of foreign materials or manufactured items is in the public's best interest.
"The Amendment provided that those goods manufactured from domestic raw
materials and those manufactured from foreign materials, when domestic materials
are not available, would have equal benefit under the act." (Sherman, 1981, p.
266) This clarification did not address the practical interpretation issues
associated with defining the terms 'unreasonable costs' or 'inconsistent with
public interest' that had become a problem for some agency heads. (Sherman,
1981, p. 266)
b. Executive Order 10582. Uniform Proceduresfor Deter-
mination
The most significant and practical alteration to the Buy American
Act was established by executive order in 1954. Executive Order 10582
established interpretation guidelines for use when applying the Buy American Act
to contract actions. The Order was primarily an effort to 'standardize' application
across all Federal agencies. (Gerber, 1975, p. 9) Until this point, Federal agencies
implemented the law through their own respective procurement regulations. Not
surprisingly many of these agencies differed in their interpretation and application
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of the law. (Goehle, 1989, p. 1 1) The Order establishes guidelines in three areas:
Foreign Origin Determination, Unreasonable Domestic Bids, and Head of Agency
Authority.
(1) Foreign Origin Determination. The Executive Order
specifies that an item is considered to be foreign made if more than fifty percent of
the value of the item comes from foreign materials. (U.S. Code Title 41, Ex.Ord
10582)
This is the first time in the history of the Act that the term
'substantially all' of a manufactured item is quantified. Prior to the Executive
Order, common practice had required that seventy-five percent of its component
cost must have originated in the U.S. (Gerber, 1975, p. 10)
(2) Unreasonable Domestic Bid. A contracting officer
can award a contract to a foreign bidder (offeror) if the lowest domestic bid
exceeds the foreign bid by six percent including duty or ten percent excluding
duty. (U.S. Code Title 41, Ex.Ord 10582) An additional six-percentage-point
differential is to be added to the foreign bid when the lowest domestic offer is
from a small business. (FAR, 1997, Part 25.105) Defense Acquisitions follow the
same procedure but require a fifty-percent price differential. (DFARS, 1998, Part
225.105)
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(3) Head of Executive Agency Authority. This section
grants the authority" to reject any bid or offer for reasons of national interest."
Agency heads can give special consideration to "small business concerns" and
suppliers who will "produce substantially all" of their product in a labor-surplus
area. An agency head could also reject bids or offers of foreign materials to
protect national security interests, after consultation with the President or his
designated representative. (U.S. Code Title 41, Ex.Ord 10582)
With the addition of Executive Order 10582, the socio-
economic influence of the Act expanded from labor and industry concerns to
encompass the interests of small businesses and labor-surplus areas.
c. Balance ofPayments Program
The scope of the Buy American Act expanded again in the early
1960s in response to growing concern over an unfavorable outflow of U.S. dollars
as a result of a continued U.S. military presence overseas. Concern in the
Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations led to two Executive Orders
establishing the Balance of Payment Program as a temporary measure in 1960 and
1962. (Ball, 1987, p. 8) The program applies only to foreign acquisitions for U.S.
use overseas, and requires that a fifty-percent differential be added to all foreign
bids (or offers.) (FAR, 1997, Part 25.302(c)) The differential allows bids from
U.S. firms to exceed those of host country firms by as much as fifty percent and
14
still win the contract. Although the Balance of Payments Program was established
in the early 1960s, the FAR still describes it as an "interim measure imposed to
alleviate the impact of Government expenditures on the Nation's balance of
international payments." (FAR, 1997, Part 25.302(a))
The current version of the FAR allows the purchase of Foreign end
products and services when:
The estimated cost is below the simplified acquisition threshold of
$100,000.
The item procured is perishable, and delivery from the U.S. would
be impractical.
The requirement can be filled only by a foreign source.
The item is for resale in overseas commissary stores.
Required by treaty or executive agreement between Governments.
The item is a petroleum product.
The item is procured with excess foreign currencies. l
The origin of the item (or service) is from Panama and the item is to
be consumed by U.S. forces in Panama.
1 The United States holds currencies of certain countries in amounts determined annually
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Amounts held above these levels are published in OMB
bulletins as excess foreign currencies. (FAR, 1997, 25.304(a))
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Balance of Payments Program restrictions have been drastically
reduced by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and the NAFTA Implementation
Act. Under each of these agreements, signatories agree to reciprocally waive buy-
national preferences in the purchase of supplies and services for Government
consumption.
E. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY OVER THE
INDUSTRIAL BASE
In several landmark legislative acts, Congress has authorized the President
and Secretary of Defense to take actions to preserve the domestic industrial
mobilization base. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Production
Act of 1950 each grant the President specific authorities in directing the
preparedness and mobilization of the industrial base. Secretary of Defense Report,
1989, p. 5) This authority led to several major policy directives:
• Executive Order 1 1490, dated 30 October 1969. This order assigned
the Secretary of Defense responsibility for developing plans to fulfill
military requirements and maintain the mobilization base. It directs
DoD to assess current capacity and take actions to overcome
problems with the industrial base. Secretary of Defense Report,
1989, p. 25)
• Defense Mobilization Order II, "Maintenance of the Mobilization
Base," dated 1 July 1980. This order directs contracting agencies to
align "current procurements with industrial mobilization plans to the
greatest extent possible." The objective of this order is to use
current DoD funds to support the mobilization base during
peacetime. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 25)
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• National Security Decision Directive No. 47, "Emergency
Mobilization Preparedness," dated 22 July 1982. This directive
established a program "to identify (domestic) production and supply
deficiencies... and to initiate actions to overcome them." It also
considers the impact of coproduction agreements, offsets with U.S.
allies, and other reciprocal trade agreements, on the domestic ability
to mobilize for war. Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 5)
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), which requires
procuring agencies to ensure full and open competition tlirough the use of
competitive procedures, allows for specific exemptions to competition in the
interest of preserving industrial mobilization objectives. (Secretary of Defense
Report, 1989, p. 26)
Each one of these laws, executive orders, and directives, provides the
President and the Secretary of Defense with the necessary authority to preserve the
domestic industrial base in the interest of national security.
F. REVERSING THE TREND OF PROTECTIONISM
The implementation of the Balance of Payments Program in 1962 marks the
last significant tightening of Buy American restrictions in U.S. legislation. Since
then, the trend in legislation has been toward the relaxation of buy-national
policies. Issues of interoperabihty with allies, a marked increase in the quality of
the foreign designs of weapons, and a flurry of free-trade agreements have
prompted legislative and policy adjustments from the early 1970s to the present.
17
1. Cooperation Among NATO Members (NATO RSI)
In the early 1970s, concern over the adequacy of NATO conventional
forces (against Warsaw Pact forces) began to eclipse buy-national sentiments. The
concept of Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) of NATO
forces began to overshadow the protectionist concerns of individual countries. By
pooling the national resources of all members, rationalization allows NATO to
achieve the maximum defense capability while reducing redundant weapon
systems. By pursuing RSI, NATO could conceivably increase both military
effectiveness and cost efficiency across the entire alliance. Although NATO
standardization had been a policy since 1949, few member nations embraced its
objectives. Extensive barriers existed as NATO nations continued to adhere to
buy-national practices. (Sherman, 1981, pp. 272-274) The biggest barriers to
NATO RSI were (and continue to be):
•
•
Most nations were not willing to make vital aspects of their security
dependent on other countries.
Frequent disagreements (within NATO) on the priority of military
requirements.
Many nations looked to the achievements in their defense sector as a
source of national pride and prestige.
Internal public pressure to maintain domestic employment and to
maintain foreign exchange through military sales.
18
• A desire within Government for increased influence in countries
outside the NATO arena which is gained through agreements to
supply arms. (Sherman, 19
,
p. 274)
Heavy U.S. emphasis on RSI in the 1970s, caused a shift in policy that
allowed a "collective" NATO approach to military procurements to emerge.
The move toward NATO RSI began with a November 1971 memorandum
from Secretary of Defense David Packard to the Service Secretaries. The memo
instructed each of them to encourage U.S. industry to "form working relationships
with foreign industrial concerns" in order to capitalize on improvements in foreign
weapons technology. In 1975, the Culver-Nunn Amendment to Public Law 94-
106 authorized the Secretary of Defense to waive the Buy American Act in an
effort to maintain Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI)
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (Ball, 1987, p. 10)
Congress again showed its support for NATO RSI by passing Public Law
94-361 in July of 1976. Then Law required that equipment procured for U.S.
forces in Europe must be standardized (or at least interoperable) with other NATO
equipment. The Law also required the Secretary of Defense to begin establishing
procurement procedures that would ensure the interoperability and standardization
of all future DoD acquisitions. These changes encouraged the Department of
Defense to use the national-interest exception to the Buy American Act to enter
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into Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Memorandums of Agreement
(MOA) with allied nations.
These legislative actions reflected the mood in Congress that NATO forces
would benefit from expansion of inter-allied procurement of arms and equipment.
Congress wanted to see this inter-allied procurement advanced through the use of
licensing and co-production agreements. (Sherman, 1981, p. 274) By this time,
Congress was signaling a drastic departure from the protectionist practices that had
shaped the Buy American Act.
The current version of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) states that it is "inconsistent with the public interest to apply
restrictions of the Buy American Act/Balance of Payments Program to the
acquisition of defense equipment which is manufactured in any of the qualifying
countries. The DFARS lists seventeen countries (predominantly NATO countries)
with which the U.S. has reciprocal defense acquisition agreements. (DFARS,
1998, Subpart 225.872-1) Manufacturers and suppliers in each of these countries
can submit offers on defense contracts without application of the fifty percent
differential that is mandated by the Buy American Act or the Balance of Payments
Program. (DFARS, 1998, Subpart 225. 872-4(b))
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2. Trade Agreements
As Congress re-prioritized issues associated with defense spending, the
trend of reciprocity in Government purchasing continually gained momentum.
Throughout the 70s, the 80s and up to the present, several monumental Trade
Agreements began to change the face of global trade. By signing each of these
agreements, the United States has committed to waiving the Buy American Act
among signatory nations. (Ball, 1987, p. 11)
a. Agreement on Government Procurement/Trade Agreement
Act of1979
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 (which encompassed the 1979
Agreement on Government Procurement [AGP]) provided the first general attempt
to reduce the barriers erected by the Buy American Act. (Sherman, 1981, p. 270)
The AGP ensures that signatories will give equal treatment to foreign and domestic
suppliers in competition for specific contracts. The purpose is for each country to
open up lucrative Government markets to international competition. This agree-
ment excludes the procurement of services, construction projects, "set asides"
(small business, minority owned businesses, and firms operating in a labor surplus
area), research and development, small purchases and matters of national security.
The current version of the FAR establishes $190,000 as a threshold for supply and
service contracts and $7,311,000 as a threshold for construction contracts. Buy-
21
American restrictions do not apply to contracting actions over these amounts.
(FAR Part 25.402 (a) (1), 1997)
b. Agreement on Government Procurement/North American
Free Trade Agreement
This agreement was followed by the Government Procurement
Chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement in December 1992, and the
1993 Agreement on Government Procurement. Each of these agreements hinges
on the signatories' commitment to reduce existing preferences for domestic
products in Government procurements. Like the 1979 agreement, the signing
nations can expect other signatories to open their Government procurements to
international competition. The 1993 AGP expands the 1979 agreement into
procurements involving services, construction work, and state and local
Governments. (Heldreth, 1994, p. 16)
The Government Procurement Chapter (Chapter Ten) of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, closely mirrors the 1993 AGP because Mexico
is not a signatory to either AGP. Each party is required to treat goods and services
from NAFTA nations the same as domestic products. All three countries excluded
these areas from consideration under Chapter Ten:
• State and local Government procurement,
• Public transportation,
• Government sponsored research and development projects,
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•Public utilities and communications,
•Military related procurements,
•Government financial services,
•Canadian publication contracts. (Heldreth, 1994, p. 31)
Each NAFTA signatory has its respective small-purchase thresholds
in the FAR. Offerors can compete for contracts above (FAR Part 25.402 (a) (3)
(ii), 1997) the threshold amounts without application of Buy-American
restrictions. The threshold for Canadian offerors is $25,000 for supply and
services contracts. For Mexican supply and service contracts the threshold is
$50,000. For offerors in both countries, the threshold for construction contracts is
$6,500,000.
G. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1933, The Buy American Act appears to have been
poorly planned, hastily passed, and inconsistently enforced. The original Act
lacked clear definition of key terms such as 'Cost reasonableness' and 'public
interest.' (Sherman, 1981, p. 266) The Act also lacked standard rules for its
application. Because of its vagueness, Congressional clarification to the intent of
the Act was necessary in 1949. Implementation guidelines for the Act did not
exist for a full twenty years after Congress passed the Act. Whether Congress ever
really intended to strictly enforce the statute can also be questioned, considering
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the obvious omission of penalties (except in section two) for violation of the Act.
All of these factors contribute to the characteristic vagueness of the Act, and have
led to inconsistent use of the Act since 1933.
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ffl. THE DECLINING PROCUREMENT BUDGET
A. INTRODUCTION
As Department of Defense officials attempt to manage the contraction of
the U.S. defense establishment that has occurred since 1985, the internal
competition for shrinking DoD funds has become intense. As the total available
DoD budget continuously declines, serious debates take place among defense
planners over how to finance the current force structure and pay for an ever-
increasing number of deployments. The answer has often been to "mortgage the
future" in order to pay for the present. (Towell, 1994, p. 182)
This chapter examines the levels of the Department of Defense's total
budget authority as well as DoD's procurement budget over the last 20 years.
While procurement is strictly defined as the act of buying goods and services for a
Government agency, the defense procurement budget is often viewed as an
investment in the future of America's war-fighting forces. Reductions in
procurement spending can have significant long-term effects on U.S. defense
capability. This chapter addresses the question: To what extent has the defense
procurement budget declined? Significant declines in the DoD procurement
budget will underscore the need to find cost-effective solutions to military
purchasing.
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B. TOTAL DOD BUDGET AUTHORITY
The Department of Defense budget has continuously declined since 1985.
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate that the DOD Budget Authority (1992 constant
dollars) reached a high point of $366.4 Billion in 1985, and a twenty-year low of
$221.6 Billion in 1997.
Table 1. U.S. Department of Defense Budget Authority 1992
Constant Dollars (In Millions)
Year GNP
Deflator
DoD Budget DoD Budget in '92 $
1977 0.454 107,906 237,678
1978 0.4857 114,531 235,806
1979 0.5267 123,595 234,659
1980 0.5819 140,651 241,710
1981 0.6421 176,110 274,272
1982 0.6865 211,513 308,103
1983 0.7195 238,900 332,036
1984 0.7545 258,176 342,182
1985 0.7829 286,827 366,365
1986 0.805 281,436 349,610
1987 0.8273 279,469 337,809
1988 0.8546 283,755 332,033
1989 0.8902 290,837 326,710
1990 0.9257 292,999 316,516
1991 0.9695 276,208 284,897
1992 1 282,127 282,127
1993 1.0252 267,194 260,626
1994 1.0492 251,364 239,577
1995 1.0745 255,651 237,926
1996 1.0991 254,406 231,468
1997 1.1283 249,990 221,563
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Table 1 (Continued)
Year GNP Deflator DoD Budget DoD Budget in '92 $
1998* 1.1589 250,697 216,323
1999* 1.19 256,315 215,391
2000* 1.2222 262,767 214,995
2001* 1.2544 269,551 214,884
2002* 1.2863 277,496 215,732


















































Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, FY98.
Figure 1. DoD Budget Authority, 1992 Constant Dollars
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The Clinton Administration's long-term budget goals call for a further
decline in the DoD budget, which is projected to level off at $214-216 Billion in
Fiscal Years 1999-2002. (Historical Tables FY 98, p. 78)
C. THE PROCUREMENT BUDGET
As the total budget for DoD has declined, so too has the DoD's
procurement account. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the trend in DoD procurement
spending over the last twenty years. Procurement reached a twenty-year high of
$123.7 Billion in 1985, and has steadily decreased to a. projected low of $36.8
Billion in 1998. The drop represents a 70% decline in procurement funds over a
thirteen-year period.
Table 2. Department of Defense Procurement Budget 1992







Proc as % of
DoDBA
1977 0.454 27,922 61,502 26
1978 0.4857 29,529 60,797 26
1979 0.5267 31,428 59,670 25
1980 0.5819 35,283 60,634 25
1981 0.6421 48,025 74,794 27
1982 0.6865 64,462 93,899 30
1983 0.7195 80,355 111,682 34
1984 0.7545 86,161 114,196 33
1985 0.7829 96,842 123,697 34
1986 0.805 92,506 114,914 33
1987 0.8273 80,234 96,983 29









Proc as % of
DoDBA
1989 0.8902 79,390 89,182 27
1990 0.9257 81,376 87,908 28
1991 0.9695 71,740 73,997 26
1992 1 62,952 62,952 22
1993 1.0252 52,789 51,491 20
1994 1.0492 44,141 42,071 18
1995 1.0745 43,571 40,550 17
1996 1.0991 42,417 38,592 17
1997 1.1283 44,156 39,135 18
1998* 1.1589 42,606 36,764 17
1999* 1.19 50,716 42,618 20
2000* 1.2222 56,997 46,635 22
2001* 1.2544 60,662 48,359 23
2002* 1.2863 68,336 53,126 25
Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, FY98.
* Projected
When the DoD budget and the procurement budget are viewed together,
(Figure 4) the downward trend in procurement spending appears to mirror the
trend of total DoD spending.
When procurement dollars are analyzed as a percentage of total DoD
spending, it becomes apparent that procurement spending is decreasing more
rapidly than the DoD budget. Figure 3 illustrates this relative drop in procurement
spending. In real terms, the DoD procurement budget has borne a disproportionate






























Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, FY98.
Figure 2. Total DoD Budget Levels & Corresponding Procurement
Budget Levels, 1992 Constant Dollars
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Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, FY98.
Figure 3. Procurement as a Percentage of the DoD Budget
The heavy cuts in procurement were intentional, however, as the Clinton
Adrninistration, Congress, and the DoD sought to shield Operations and
Maintenance funds from the drastic effects of the decline in the defense budget.
Operations and Maintenance funds are largely viewed as "readiness" funds,
because they fund the operations tempo, or "op tempo" of operational units in the
U.S. military. Robust O&M funding ensures near-term readiness. The Clinton
Administration's stated strategy in 1994 was to cut procurement funding "to keep
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the total defense budget within limits. Meanwhile, the services will have to live
off the large inventories ofmodern weaponry amassed during the flush years of the
1980s." (Towell, 1994, p. 335)
In his 1 994 testimony before Congress, then-Secretary of Defense William
Perry, warned Congress of the implications of stabilizing O&M funding at the
expense of procurement funding: "our equipment will be aging year for year. In
time we will have equipment which becomes difficult to maintain, and that in itself
will become a readiness problem." (Towell, 1994, p. 336)
D. THE FUTURE OF THE PROCUREMENT BUDGET
The Clinton Administration projects an improvement in the procurement
budget for the fiscal years 1999-2002. These planned "out-year" improvements
can be seen in Figures 4 and 5. While former Secretary Perry accepted the near-
term cuts in procurement funds during his tenure, he was ever mindful of the
increase in procurement that should come in the near future. He told the Senate
Armed Services Committee on February 8, 1994: "There will come a time when
we have used up that excess inventory, and then we will have to start building at
higher rates than we now are building." (Towell, 1994, p. 335) That future
increase in procurement spending may be coming more slowly than former
Secretary Perry anticipated, as the President's FY 1999 budget submission further
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delays recovery for the procurement budget. Figure 4 portrays the revised
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Source: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, FY98 andFY99.
Figure 4. Future Years Projected Procurement Budget as a
Percentage of the DoD Budget
E. CONCLUSION
With overall Defense dollars declining and operational tempo increasing,
the trend has been to pay for the increasing Operations and Maintenance costs by
"dipping into" the procurement budget account. This tendency has caused alarm
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among those familiar with the Defense budget. One official from the private
Defense Budget Project characterized the trend as "mortgaging (the) future" to pay
for current force structure. (Towell, 1994, p. 182) Whatever the purpose for the
decline, it is clear that the DoD must take a critical look at how it spends its scarce
resources and make conscious decisions to spend its procurement dollars wisely.
One way to maximize Pentagon spending power may be to reduce (or eliminate)
Buy American requirements. Such a reduction would be harmonious with the
tenor of free trade agreements that the U.S. has recently signed.
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IV. THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter explores the widely-accepted economic theory that justifies the
reduction of barriers to international trade. A reduction in trade barriers may help
the DoD and other allies stretch limited defense procurement funds. Tariffs and
other forms of protectionism produce marketplace inefficiencies that result in
losses to consumers (in public procurements, the Government is the consumer).
Economists often agree that protectionist policies can be bad for everyone.
B. THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
International trade theory has its historical and logical roots in the theory of
comparative advantage. The theory was first set forth by Adam Smith in The
Wealth of Nations and has direct implications for protectionist policies, such as
the Buy American Act:
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt
to make at home what it will cost him more to make than buy. ... If a
foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we
ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the
produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have
some advantage (Dolan, 1983, p. 693) (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995,
p. 463).
Smith's ideas were formalized by David Ricardo into the Theory of
Comparative Advantage. Using a simple numerical example, Ricardo
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demonstrated how it was to the benefit of both countries for England to export
wool to Portugal, and import wine in return, even though both products could be
produced at a lower cost (in terms of labor hours) in Portugal. (Dolan, 1983, p.
693)
This theory is extremely relevant in today's globally linked economy. By
relaxing buy-national practices and tariffs, the economies of each country will
expand, reaping the benefits of free trade.
The implication of this theory is that countries with industries efficient at
producing airplanes could specialize in the manufacturing of airplanes for other
nations, while countries that have an abundance of raw materials would become
the supplier for other nations. In the short run, each country's economy would
experience cyclical problems as inefficient industries are shut down and labor and
resources transition to industries where the country has its comparative advantage.
In the long run, free trade can expand total consumption to points beyond the
production possibilities of all participating countries.
1. An Illustration of Absolute and Comparative Advantage
The following example draws heavily on the illustrative techniques found
in Basic Economics by Edwin G. Dolan and Macroeconomics: Private and Public
Choice by James D. Gwartney and Richard L. Stroup. This model focuses on two
countries, England and Portugal, and the production of two goods, wool and wine.
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For simplicity, labor is the only factor of production considered in the production
of these commodities. To accentuate the potential gains from free trade, we will
assume that Portugal is the most efficient producer of both products. The law of
comparative advantage will illustrate how both countries can gain from trade even
when one of them can produce both products more efficiently than the other
country. Table 3 presents a situation in which Portugal has an absolute advantage
in the production of both goods (Columns a and b).
Table 3. Gains from Specialization and Trade
Output per Worker Day Potential Change in
Output
(§1 lb} {£] (d}
Country Wool Wine Wool Wine
England 2 1 +6 -3
Portugal 3 9 -3 ±9
Change in Total Output +3 +6
Whether it is due to more experience or highly skilled workers, Portugal
can produce three bushels of wool per worker day, compared with two bushels per
worker day for England. Additionally, Portuguese workers are capable of
producing nine gallons of wine per worker day, where English workers are able to
produce only one gallon per worker day. (Gwartnry and Stroup, 1995, p. 466)
There are two differences in the cost structures of the two countries. While
Portugal clearly has lower per unit labor costs for each item, England has a lower
relative cost for wool. In England, a reallocation of labor to produce one more
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bushel of wool means giving up the opportunity to produce one half of a gallon of
wine. Conversely, a reallocation of Portuguese labor to produce one more bushel
of wool means giving up the opportunity to produce three gallons of wine. In
terms of the opportunity cost of producing wine, wool is cheaper in England than
in Portugal. When the cost of each good is considered, not in terms of its labor
inputs, but in terms of the other good, a comparative advantage can be ascertained.
(Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 467)
If England shifted three workers to the wool industry (Columns c and d), it
could expand its wool output by six bushels (two units per worker). The
associated loss of shifting those workers away from the wine industry is three
gallons of wine (one unit per worker). If Portugal were to reallocate its labor in
the opposite direction, moving one worker to the production of wine (away from
wool) the result would be an increase in nine gallons of wine while wool
production will drop three bushels. This reallocation of labor between the two
countries has increased their joint output by three bushels of wool and six gallons
of wine. As each country focuses its resources on the production of those goods
that it can produce at a relatively low cost, the aggregate output of both countries
expands. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, pp. 466-467)
But why would Portugal be interested in opening its markets to foreign
trade if it already has the absolute advantage in producing both goods? A
superficial look at labor costs shows that Portugal can produce everything at home
more cheaply than it is produced abroad. A closer analysis proves that absolute
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advantage is unimportant in analyzing patterns of trade. Only comparative
advantage is important. If an enterprising British wool exporter brings one bushel
of wool to a market in Portugal, Portuguese merchants would be accustomed to
paying three gallons of wine (or its monetary equivalent) for that one bushel of
wool. The British exporter would be accustomed to getting only one half a gallon
of wine for his product. Any trading price between these two extremes (such as 1
gallon of wine for a bushel of wool) would result in a beneficial outcome for both
parties.
2. Comparative Advantage and Expanding Consumption
Possibilities
As the trading nations jointly expand their output, they are also expanding
their consumption possibilities. A production possibilities model shows how this
is possible. This model assumes that Portugal has 25 million workers and England
has 100 million. With these worker populations and the productivity information
given in Table 3, the production possibilities of each nation are presented in
Figures 5 and 6.
Without trade, each country's consumption is confined by its production
possibilities, such as points El and PI. Free trade can expand the consumption
possibility for both countries. Assume both countries agree upon an inter-mediate
price of one bushel of wool for one gallon of wine. When England specializes in
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Figure 5. Production Possi-
bilities, England
Figure 6. Production Possi-
bilities, Portugal
can consume at a point (E2) well above its production possibilities line of AB.
Free trade and specialization now allows England to consume along line BC
(Figure 7).
At the same time, Portugal is specializing in the production of wine (point
N). With specialization and free trade (Figure 8), Portugal can produce the good
that it has the comparative advantage in, and trade one gallon of wine for one
bushel of English wool. With trade, Portugal can now consume along line NQ.
The results of unrestricted trade are attractive. Portugal can produce 225
million gallons of wine, export 100 million gallons to England (for 100 million
bushels of wool) and still maintain 125 million gallons of wine for domestic
consumption. Concurrently, England can produce 200 million bushels of wool,







Figure 7. Production Possi- Figure 8. Production Possi-
bilities, England bilities, Portugal
100 million bushels of wool for domestic use. Both countries are consuming at
points above their production possibilities (E2 and P2). Specialization and
unrestricted trade allow both countries to expand their joint output, and increase
their consumption of both products. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, pp. 467-468)
"The implications of the law of comparative advantage are clear; trade
between nations will lead to an expansion in total output and mutual gain for each
trading partner when each country specializes in the good that it can produce at a
relatively low cost. Each country will use the proceeds to purchase the goods that
it could produce only at a high cost." (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, pp. 469-470)
41
C. THE ECONOMICS OF TARIFFS AND QUOTAS
A tariff is simply a tax on foreign imports. High tariffs can have a
substantial impact on the forces of supply and demand, significantly altering the






Qdi Qd2 Qj Qi
Quantity (Automobiles)
Figure 9. Impact of a Tariff
and volume of automobiles produced. In the absence of a tariff, the world price of
automobiles (Pw) prevails in the U.S. and abroad. At this price, U.S. consumers
are willing to purchase a quantity of Qi automobiles.
Qdi represents the quantity of automobiles that domestic suppliers would
sell at that price. Foreign suppliers would provide the rest of the automobiles (Qr
Qdi) demanded by U.S. consumers at price Pw . When the U.S. imposes a tariff (t)
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on automobiles, consumers must pay Pw +t for foreign automobiles. At the new
domestic price Pw+t, U.S. consumers are only willing to purchase a quantity of
Q2 automobiles. Qd2 represents the quantity of automobiles that domestic
suppliers would sell at that price. Foreign suppliers would provide the rest of the
automobiles (Q2- Qd2) demanded by U.S. consumers at price Pw +t. The end result
is higher prices and fewer automobiles purchased.
Domestic producers and the Government benefit from the tariff at the
expense of consumers. At the protected market price of Pw +t, domestic
producers will be able to expand their output from Qd i to Qd2- In effect, the tariff
acts as a subsidy to domestic producers. Area E represents the gain that domestic
producers will enjoy in the form of additional net revenues. Area T represents
additional tax revenues that the Government will collect. A loss of market
efficiency is represented by areas L and M. The entire area E+T+L+M is paid by
consumers as a result of artificially raised prices.
The tariff causes a diversion of resources away from domestic industries,
where we have a comparative advantage, towards an industry where we are a
high-cost producer. The gains from specialization and free trade go unrealized.
Similarly, quotas are designed to protect domestic industries from foreign
competition. Quotas also result in inequities and a loss of marketplace efficiency.
A quota places a limit on the quantity of a foreign good that can be sold
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domestically. Figure 10 illustrates the impact of a quota on the price and
amount of peanuts sold in the U.S. If the quota were not present, the world price
Domestic Supply
Quota established import levels
Imports before Quota
Domestic Demand
Qui Q02 Q2 Qi
Quantity (Peanuts)
Figure 10. Impact of a Quota
of peanuts (Pw) would dominate. At this price, U.S. consumers are willing to
purchase a quantity of Qi peanuts. Qdi represents the quantity of peanuts
that domestic suppliers would sell at that price. Foreign suppliers would provide
the balance of the peanut demand (Qi - Qdi)
When a U.S. imposed quota limits peanut imports to Q2 - Qd2 (well below
free trade import levels) the price of peanuts increases from Pw to Pq . At the
higher domestic price Pq U.S. consumers are willing to purchase a quantity of only
Q2 peanuts. Qd2 represents the quantity of peanuts that domestic suppliers would
gladly sell at the inflated price. As with tariffs, the entire cost of area E+T+L+M
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is borne by consumers. Area E represents the additional revenues that domestic
producers will gain due to the market protection that the quota provides. A loss of
market efficiency is again represented by areas L and M.
One difference between quotas and Tariffs is the beneficiary of the area T.
In the case of tariffs, the Government is the beneficiary of the area represented by
T. The Government reaps those benefits in the form of higher revenues resulting
from the tariff. If quotas are used, Area T represents a benefit to the foreign
producers that hold import permits from the U.S. Government. The right to sell
goods at a artificially high price (Pq) is a prized privilege. Many foreign producers
heavily lobby the U.S. Government to secure the ability to sell in the U.S. market
at a protected price. Quotas reward domestic and foreign importers with higher
prices at the expense of consumers.
D. THE MYTH OF "JOB PROTECTION"
It is a common belief among many people that trade restrictions "protect"
domestic jobs. While this may be true for the industry being shielded, this
protectionism always costs jobs in more efficient industries.
One side effect of protectionism is the associated loss in foreign sales of
domestic-made goods. U.S. purchases of foreign goods provide foreigners with
the U.S. dollars needed to purchase American goods. If that initial sale is
restricted, foreigners have fewer dollars available for the purchase of American
goods and the subsequent demand for American-made goods declines. The result
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is fewer export sales and less employment in U.S. export industries. This loss of
jobs offsets any jobs saved in the protected market. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995,
p. 477)
The discouragement that trade restrictions bring drives manufacturers
toward more expensive factors of production. Instead of buying the best-priced
machine tools, raw materials, and labor, manufacturers are directed towards more
inefficiently-priced (and perhaps uncompetitive) domestic goods. These expensive
inputs serve to make domestic products more costly and less competitive. This
combination tends to further reduce domestic employment in the long run.
(Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 477)
Restrictions on imports "direct resources away from areas where domestic
producers have a comparative advantage and into areas where domestic producers
are relatively inefficient." (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 477) The net effect is a
loss of output. Fewer resources are employed in the production of goods in our
efficient industries, while more resources are squandered in an attempt to produce
goods that we make poorly (proven by our inability to compete on the world
market.) The result is a lower per capita output due to trade barriers. (Gwartney
and Stroup, 1995, p. 477)
A familiar model demonstrating the benefits of free trade is the unrestricted
trade among the fifty states. Free trade is recognized as a major source of
prosperity for each of the states. Citizens from Michigan do not complain about
the loss of agricultural jobs due to "imports" of citrus fruits from Florida or grains
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from Kansas. If there are jobs lost in Michigan, the effects are not long lasting.
The loss of jobs due to "imports" releases workers for employment to more
efficient Michigan industries, such as, the automobile industry. In the more
efficient industry, a worker from Michigan can produce more value and generate
more income. By allowing the free market to direct the efficient flow of resources,
each of the states is allowed to "specialize" in its most efficient industries while
relying on the other states to supply its other demands. Just as the fifty states
benefit from free trade, so too can nations that reduce or eliminate barriers to free
trade. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 477)
Caution must be exercised in the removal of trade barriers. The trauma of
cyclical unemployment and idle capital (and resources) could cause a recession as
less competitive industries are shut down and factors of production transition to
employment in more efficient industries. The removal of trade barriers must be
gradual to minimize the "shock effect" and spread out the costs associated with
relocation. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 477) Spreading the costs over several
years may prove more expensive, but a gradual lifting of tariffs and quotas may
allow domestic producers enough time to adjust to the new competitive
marketplace and avoid the trauma of plant closings.
E. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROTECTION IN TWO
INDUSTRIES
In their book, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States , Gary
Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliot analyze twenty-one "protected markets."
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The metrics that the authors use to measure the costs and benefits of protection in
an industry are:
• The projected number of lost jobs if trade were liberalized.
• The decrease in costs that would result if trade were liberalized.
This section illustrates the results of their analysis on the U.S. machine tool
and ball bearing industries in 1990.
1. The Machine Tool Industry
In 1986, the Reagan Administration sought to protect the domestic Machine
Tool industry by limiting imports through "voluntary" export restraint agreements
(VRAs). The U.S. received agreements (both formal and informal) from Japan,
Taiwan, Brazil, Italy, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Switzerland. The VRAs were in addition to an existing four percent
(average) ad valorem tariff. The Hufbauer and Elliot analysis estimated that the
VRAs carried the equivalent effect of a 46.6 percent tariff on foreign machine
tools.
To present the impact that trade liberalization has on both the domestic
market and the import market, Hufbauer and Elliot present partial equilibrium








Figure 11. Effects in the Import
Market of Removing
a Trade Barrier




With the trade barrier in place, the average price of an import is $52,721 in
the protected market. At this price, U.S. customers import 20,800 units of various
types of machine tools (Figure 11) In the protected domestic market (Figure 12),
the average price of a U.S. made machine tool is $73,304. At this price, domestic
quantity demanded is 16,300 units. If the VRAs were lifted and the tariff
remained in place, the price for the imported good would immediately fall to the
world price of $35,952 (Figure 1 1) In response to the dropping price in the import
market, the demand for the domestic substitute (Figure 12) falls, shifting the
demand curve from Dd to D' d . The quantity of U.S.-made machine tools
demanded would fall to 14,000 units at the lower price of $62,924. Responding to
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a drop in price in the domestic market, demand for imports (Figure 11) will shift
from Dm to D'm and the quantity demanded at the world price will be 25,000 units.
The changes in price and quantities result in a gain of consumer surplus in
both the import and domestic market. According to Hufbauer and Elliot, consumer
surplus gains total $542 million. This gain is illustrated by areas E, F, G, and M in
Figures 11 and 12. Area F represents the $350 million quota rent gain that is
transferred to consumers from foreign interests that were permitted to sell (below
the VRA quantities) in the U.S. market. Area G represents a $35 million recovery
of deadweight loss that occurred from an inefficient allocation of resources due to
the VRA. The consumer surplus gain of $157 million in the domestic market
(areas E and M) is offset by a domestic producer surplus loss of the same amount.
The end result is a welfare gain of $385 million. This gain to U.S. consumers
comes at the cost of 1,534 jobs in the machine tool industry, or $251,000 per
unemployed worker. (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994, pp. 31-34 and 91-93)
2. The Ball Bearing Industry
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 initially established a forty-five
percent plus a ten-cent-per-pound tariff on ball and roller bearings. Several rounds
of negotiations and trade concessions have reduced the tariff since 1930.
Multilateral trade negotiations in 1980 allowed the U.S. to maintain an ad valorem
tariff on ball bearings of eleven percent. (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994, p. 46)
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Using an analysis similar to that in the machine tool example, we can see
the impact that trade liberalization would have on both the domestic and the
import markets for ball bearings. Hufbauer and Elliot's partial equilibrium models
for each market are presented in Figures 13 and 14.
With the tariff in place, the average price of a pound of imported ball
bearings is $1.47. At this price, U.S. customers import 331 million pounds of ball
bearings (Figure 13). In the protected domestic market (Figure 14) the average
price of a pound of U.S.-made ball bearings is $3.33. At this price, domestic
quantity demanded is 416 million pounds. If the tariff were lifted, the price for the
imported good would immediately fall to the world price of $1.32 per pound
(Figure 13). In response to the dropping price in the import market, the demand
for the domestic substitute (Figure 14) falls, shifting the demand curve from Da to
D'd. The quantity of U.S.-made ball bearings demanded would fall to 412
million pounds at the price of $3.30 per pound. Responding to a drop in price in
the domestic market, demand for imports (Figure 13) will shift from Dm to D'm and
the quantity of imported ball bearings demanded at the world price will be 340
million pounds.
The changes in price and quantities result in a gain of consumer surplus in
both the import and domestic market. According to Hufbauer and Elliot, consumer

















Figures 13 and 14. Area F represents a $50 million transfer from the U.S.
Government to consumers in the form of lost tariff revenues. Area G represents a
$1 million recovery of deadweight loss that occurred from an inefficient allocation
of resources. The consumer surplus gain of $13 million in the domestic market
(areas E and M) is offset by a domestic producer surplus loss of the same amount.
The end result is a welfare gain of $51 million. This gain to U.S. consumers
comes at the cost of 146 jobs in the domestic ball bearing industry. That
represents a consumer surplus gain of over $349,300 per unemployed worker.
(Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994, pp. 31-34, 47)
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F. CONCLUSION
The preponderance of economic theory and analysis suggests that
protectionist practices result in market inefficiencies and a misallocation of
resources. In the markeplace, quotas and tariffs often benefit a very narrow range
of workers and producers, while the costs of protecting that industry are spread
across a broad base of consumers. In the arena of public procurement, the entire
cost of protecting American industry is paid by just one consumer, the U.S.
Government. As DoD strives to become a more "sophisticated customer," we
cannot ignore the benefits that can be achieved by allowing the competitive forces
of the marketplace to work in the consumer's favor.
The economic theory discussed in this chapter yields several points that are
relevant to future discussions of the Buy American Act. They are:
• Unrestricted trade and specialization among trading partners allows
participants to expand their joint output and increase consumption.
• Tariffs and quotas causes a diversion of resources away from
domestic industries where we are competitive, towards inefficient
domestic industries.
• Tariffs and quotas benefit a narrow range of producers (domestic and
foreign) at the expense of consumers while saving some jobs in the
protected industry.
• Protectionism lowers the overall output of the domestic economy,
and prohibits job creation in offices and industries that are competi-





While erecting trade barriers can be politically popular, restrictions can
carry high hidden costs. As illustrated in the previous chapter, protectionism
benefits a very narrow group of producers while the costs are widely dispersed
over a largely-ignorant consumer population. In the case of a Government buyer,
the effects of price increases are borne by the lone consumer. This chapter will
juxtapose the benefits achieved by the Buy American Act with the costs associated
with protection. This analysis explores both quantitative and qualitative arguments
surrounding the Buy American Act.
B. MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS
The most meaningful measure of costs is the increase in prices associated
with a mandatory domestic preference. Another measure of costs is the change in
procurement lead times that results from the requirement to "Buy American."
Measuring the benefits of the BAA is much more difficult. The primary
benefit of the BAA is the nation's ability to mobilize its industrial base in the
event of a national emergency. Finding a measure of such an intangible asset is
difficult.
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C. INDICATORS OF U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN SEVERAL
INDUSTRIES
Table 4 presents data for several industries covered by the Buy American
restrictions. The direct and indirect DoD demand (column b) are estimated from
the Defense Economic Impact Modeling System (DEIMS). DEIMS is an input-
output model of the economy that translates defense budget data into demand on
the U.S. economy. It is useful because it is the only measure of the sizable
indirect demand resulting from the complex systems that DoD typically procures.
(Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 51)
Table 4. U.S. Industry Indicators
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
DoD Demand DoD Demand as
Industry







Utilization %Direct | Indirect
Food 1.005 1,547 0.8% 0.9% 424.5% 71%
Clothing 434 673 1.9 25.7 6.2 73
Fabrics 95 850 1.7 7.7 36.9 76
Hand Tools 194 177 6 21.4 34.9 68
Ship Construction 8,086 24 91.7 NC 58
Coal Mining 1 1113 4 0.4 40.2 NA
Mortars and Ammunition 5,234 787 124.8 3.1 420 DW
Machine Tools 1580 1465 17 16.8 2.6 67
Administrative Vehicles 85 6 0.1 32.8 15.5 78
Valves 105 523 5.8 11 63.2 54
Ferrous Forgings 14 550 21.7 2 132.1 47
Nonferrous Forgings 13 390 37.1 NC 65




DW- Data witheld by Department of Commerc e du s to unreliabil rty
Source: Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 52.
Column (c) presents DoD demand as a percent of total demand on the
industry. This information suggests the extent to which the industry may be
dependent on defense procurements. In many cases, DoD demand is such a small
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part of total industry shipments that Buy American restrictions appear to have little
positive impact in assisting the industry. In the few industries where DoD demand
is a relatively high percentage of output, the Buy American Act has a greater
influence. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, pp. 51, 65)
Columns (d) and (e) provide some useful insight into the competitiveness of
these U.S. industries in the world marketplace. A low import-penetration
percentage and a high export percentage indicates an internationally-competitive
domestic good. This is clearly the case in the food, munitions, and ferrous forging
markets. The market data for valves, fabrics, and hand tools are less
straightforward, but the high percentages of exports in column (e) suggest that
these industries can compete on a global scale. For industries with high import-
penetration percentages and low export percentages "the cost impact of Buy
American restrictions is likely to be higher." (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989,
p. 51)
D. THE COSTS OF "BUYING AMERICAN"
This section details the liabilities of the Buy American Act and
protectionism in general. Both this section and Section D serve as a backdrop for
discussion of the primary research question: "What are the costs and benefits of
upholding the Buy American Act?"
57
1. Increased Costs
Both economic theory and procurement experience show that protectionist
practices lead to increased costs. The true extent of these price increases has
proven difficult to capture. "There has always been an assumption that the
increased costs associated with Buy American restrictions are acceptable and will
pay off in the long term" (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 7). This section
explores a range of possibilities concerning the extent of price increases that DoD
pays as a result of the Buy American Act and other protectionist practices.
a. Increased Costs in the Anchor Chain and Mooring Chain
Industry
A sole-source situation in the Navy's procurement of anchor and
mooring chain permits a direct analysis of increased costs and the number of U.S.
jobs actually protected. The Navy reports it is paying prices about 30 percent
above market price in mooring chain, and 40 percent in anchor chain prices, to
maintain a low-rate/high-capacity, or "warm," production capability in the U.S.
These increased prices were projected to cost the Navy $6.8 million in just
mooring chain purchases between FY 86 to FY 90. The restriction is credited with
keeping the sole-source provider (Baldt) in business, saving 100 jobs in Chester,
PA. In this instance, protection in the highly-competitive world market for anchor
and mooring chain costs the Government $680,000 in increased prices per
American job saved over that four year period. (Secretary of Defense Report,
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1989, p. A-65) The unique situation of a lone U.S. production source and a highly
competitive world market allow us to directly associate the costs of protection with
the benefits of U.S. jobs retained. Making the same comparisons with other
defense industries has proven difficult, although a 1989 report from the Secretary
of Defense to Congress concludes that Buy American restrictions have had similar
effects in the machine tool industry (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. A-90)
and negatively impacted other industries as well.
b. Price Increases in the Ball Bearing and Machine Tool
Industries
Although it is difficult to determine a specific cost impact that is
directly attributable to the Buy American Act, we can use specific examples in
related industries to capture a realistic range of price increases resulting from
protectionist practices. From analysis of industries conducted by Hufbauer and
Elliot, we know that trade restrictions cause a thirty-five percent price increase in
the machine tool market and a four percent price increase in the ball bearing
market. (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994, pp. 47, 93)
Table 5. Price Increases as a Direct Result of Trade Restrictions
Import Domestic (Pm*Qm)+(Pd*Qd) Change
Pm Qm Pd Qd Qm+Qd
Machine Tools
Without Restriction 35.9 25 62.9 14 45.6
With Restriction 52.7 20.8 73.3 16.3 61.8 35%
Ball Bearings
Without Restriction 1.32 340 3.3 412 2.4
With Restriction 1.47 331 3.33 416 2.5 4%
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c. Price Implicationsfor the Department ofDefense
An examination of industry prices yields a wide range of possible
price increases:
• High-Carbon Ferrochrome (discussed later in Chapter V) prices
increased 2%.
• Ball Bearing prices increased 4%.
• Mooring Chain prices increased 30%.
• Machine Tool prices increased 35%.
• Anchor Chain prices increased 40%.
Using a range from two percent to forty percent, we can assess the
possible impact of price increases on DoD's annual procurement budget.
Table 6. The Possible Impact of Increased Prices on DoD
Procurements
Year DoD's Proc BA Impact of an Increase in Price Levels (Billions of $
(Billions) 2% 4% 10% 20% 30% 40%
1996 42.4 0.848 1.696 4.24 8.48 12.72 16.96
1997 44.2 0.884 1.768 4.42 8.84 13.26 17.68
1998 42.6 0.852 1.704 4.26 8.52 12.78 17.04
Even at the very lowest levels of price increases, it is clear that
protecting domestic industries comes at a very significant price.
2. The Cost of Preserving an Industrial Base Can Be Prohibitive
As DoD Procurement budgets drop (DoD's demand), the costs of
maintaining a "warm" production base are becoming prohibitive. Protectionism
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can serve to save jobs in the short run, but it also postpones innovation (or makes
it unnecessary.)
For decades, France has grappled with government's role in subsidizing its
industrial base, specifically with the aerospace corporation Aerospatiale. After
continual losses, France is now looking to divest itself of the corporation. Due to
years of "government sponsored inefficiencies" virtually the entire French
aerospace industry requires "major government support in the form of cash
infusions to periodically bail out their balance sheets." (Augustine, 1996) A
balance between competitive forces of the marketplace and maintenance of a
strategic industrial base must be maintained to ensure that industry could respond
effectively upon full mobilization.
3. Redundant Research and Development Projects Among Allies
In 1992, a pair of DODIG audits examined the potential savings that could
be achieved if current U.S. Research and Development (R&D) programs merged
with international cooperative research and development projects. The reports
conclude that "the Military Departments have not taken full advantage of foreign
Nondevelopmental Items to meet U.S. military needs." (DODIG, 1992, pp. i, 5)
The October 1992 report estimates that the DoD could have saved as much as $10
Billion (FY 92 -FY 97) on 150 different R&D programs if "fully effective
international cooperative research and development programs" were established.
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(DODIG,1992, pp. i, 10) The reports conclude that the U.S. is missing many
opportunities to lower the defense budget and improve interoperability and
standardization among its allies. (Frasier, 1993, p. 20) (DODIG, 1992, p. 10)
(DODIG, 1992, p. 11) Combining procurement efforts would allow the U.S. and
its allies to effectively spend limited procurement dollars. The combined efforts
would also allow allies mutual access to technological advances.
4. Determining "Foreign Origin"
The Buy American Act requires suppliers to certify that an item provided to
the Government meets the "fifty percent components test," which means that more
than fifty percent of the value of the item's components must be of domestic
origin. With this requirement comes the additional administrative burden (and
associated costs) of tracking the origin of all components of the end item.
Contracting agencies typically experience delays in procurements because of the
requirement to determine origin. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. A-8) In
an era of multi-national corporations, it is mandatory that a prime contractor must
track the national origin of components made by manufacturing concerns within its
own corporation.
In 1986, the House Armed Services committee estimated that even with the
Buy American Act in place, Asian nations already supply U.S. industry with
eighty percent of the mihtary's silicon chips. Market forces have caused U.S.
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manufacturers of military equipment to turn to foreign sources of supply because
of price and quality. (Ball, 1987, p. 18)
There is also a considerable amount of confusion surrounding the
application of the rules of origin. This confusion can often cause significant time
delays in procurements. Because the rule fails to take into account the cost of
labor, the true origin of a good may be difficult to determine. In testimony before
Congress, a representative from a computer industry association demonstrated how
a U.S. made product could fail the rule-of-origin test. A product with $90 in labor
costs, $20 for U.S.-made computer boards, and $30 for Japanese-made chips
would be classified as a foreign product, because over 50% of its physical
components are of foreign origin. (Frasier, 1993, p. 12) For this reason, a 1993
reform panel recommended that the "fifty percent components test" be replaced by
a test of "substantial transformation." (DAD- Pilot Program Contract Formation
and Administration, 1998) As the name implies, a rule of "substantial transforma-
tion" would allow commercial sellers to use the most efficient facilities,
employees, and supplier networks, (regardless of nationality) in the development
of a product for a Government contract. The only requirement would be major
assembly (or substantial transformation) would have to take place in the United
States.
The requirement to certify that products are of domestic origin adds
significantly to the bureaucracy that accompanies the award of a government
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contract. Eliminating such a requirement would reduce the administrative burden
on the contractor, and could ultimately lead to lower prices for the buyer.
5. Trade Retaliation
The existence of the Buy American Act (BAA) signals discrimination to our
trading partners, and declares the U.S. to be a closed market. It is clear that
European Community (EC) members often view the U.S. market as closed. EC
negotiators frequently point to the BAA as a barrier during trade talks. In 1993,
the European Community proposed the Buy European Act. Similar in structure to
the Buy American Act, the Buy European Act required the addition of a three
percent "leveling factor" to all foreign bids on public procurements. (Frasier,
1993, p. 15)
Recent Senate debate over BAA authority, caused Senator John McCain to
remark "If we continue this Buy American foolishness we will harm U.S. trade. . .1
wouldn't blame our allies for retaliating." (Finnegan, 1996, pp. 5-11) When
considering strict enforcement of the Buy American Act, lawmakers must ask
themselves "What will happen to the jobs supported by exports to foreign
markets?" (Franklin and Gay, 1996)
The short term benefits of enforcing protectionist statutes are overshadowed
by the longer term effects that trade retaliation can bring. Domestic companies
that are competitive in international markets are the first to feel the repercussions
of trade retaliation. Trading partners that perceive that their goods are being
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discriminated against in our markets are quick to reciprocate with trade restrictions
of their own. Given our apparent comparative advantage (Table 4, column e) in
armaments and forgings (both significant goods in the public purchase market),
brandishing buy-national policies may be a "self-inflicted" wound in the long-run.
6. Increased Lead Time
BAA requirements increase lead time for two reasons;
• Procurement lead times increase due to additional regulation require-
ments and larger Contract Administration workloads. (Secretary of
Defense Report, 1989, p. A-89)
• Production lead times increase because mandatory purchases are
placed on domestic production capabilities that have eroded due to
intense competition on the world market.
In the struggling domestic machine tool industry of the early 1980s, a high
level of unfilled orders caused delivery times to increase rapidly. Buy American
restrictions caused the average delivery time to rise to two years in 1980,
compared with a two-month average delivery schedule for foreign tool builders.
(Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. A-75) According to the National Machine
Tool Builders' Association NMTBA, "the limited capacity of the (domestic)
machine tool industry would be a bottleneck in any major mobilization effort"
(Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 56) It is important to note that this erosion
of production capability occurred while the Buy American Act and tariffs were
firmly in place.
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A dramatic erosion of production capabilities in the domestic woolen
market caused production lead time on woolen products to increase from 180 days
to 365 days. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. A-8)
Because of DoD's huge stockpiles of the past, high lead times may have
been invisible to the user. Following DoD's reduction of its logistics
infrastructiire, it is more likely that these increased lead times would begin to
affect operational units.
7. Public Demand for Quality
As annual budgets continue to decline, the American public is demanding
more value for its tax dollar. The United States taxpayers are demanding greater
efficiency and solid economic decision making in Federal procurements. This
demand is often at odds with the strategic goal of keeping a "warm" production
base in critical technologies. (Ball, 1987, p. 20)
When the U.S. tax dollars are spent for weapons that will equip the Armed
Forces, taxpayers are rightfully adamant about quality. By closing weapons
acquisitions to foreign makers, America is creating a separate market where
quality is outweighed by political considerations. In the end, the military has
fielded inferior equipment, and taxpayers have paid more for less. (Franklin and
Gay, 1996) Very few people could argue against acquiring the very best weapons
at the very best price, regardless of the nationality of the manufacturer.
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E. THE BENEFITS OF "BUYING AMERICAN"
This section details the arguments for maintaining the Buy American Act.
This section continues the background discussion of the primary research question:
"What are the costs and benefits of upholding the Buy American Act?"
1. It Maintains the U.S. Industrial Base
Awarding contracts to foreign manufacturers chips away at an already
deteriorating manufacturing sector. The U.S. Department of Defense should
focus on U.S. firms when choosing contractors for weapon systems. Should the
United States need to mobilize industry in time of war, a well-maintained
industrial base would be in a position to immediately respond and continue to
sustain the U.S. Armed Forces throughout any conflict. Many European countries
already maintain their defense industrial base by subsidizing industry. France has
heavily subsidized its aerospace industry, putting many U.S. firms at a
disadvantage when competing head to head for public or private contracts.
2. National Security
An additional argument for maintaining a defense-oriented industrial base is
the issue of national security. If the U.S. were to rely on foreign suppliers for
defense-related material, nations that oppose U.S. policy could withhold shipment
of crucial materials or manufactured items. While the national security argument
has some validity, it is often abused by special interests seeking protection for their
industry. Relatively few industries could seriously be considered vital to our
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national defense. (Gwartney and Stroup, 1995, p. 478) BAA restrictions should
be imposed only in very narrow instances, where the President or the Secretary of
Defense has determined that a domestic production capacity is vital to U.S.
interests.
3. The Industrial Base, National Security and the High-Carbon
Ferrochrome Industry
There have been instances where Buy American restrictions were employed
successfully, effectively preserving the domestic industrial base and ensuring
national security. In 1984, a Department of Commerce (DOC) investigation
concluded that the domestic High-Carbon Ferrochrome (HCF) industry had been
adversely impacted by (foreign) Government subsidized imports. The DOC
recommended that "action be taken to preserve U.S. HCF processing capability."
(Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. B-ll) The main domestic HCF producer,
Macalloy, Inc., had declared bankruptcy one year earlier, and was uncompetitive
in the world market. The President and Secretary of Defense determined that
maintaining a domestic HCF production capability was a matter of national
security, and they implemented very narrowly-focused Buy American provisions
that would supplement and sustain U.S. production for ten years (1984-93.) The
plan worked: the guaranteed demand for domestically produced HCF was enough
to maintain an efficient rate of production at the Macalloy plant until commercial
demand could recover from a deep recession. The producer is once again
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competitive on the world market. The restriction allowed the producer to escape
bankruptcy and survive a recession, while maintaining a solid production base in
the U.S. The cost of implementing this restriction was negligible (only a two
percent increase in price) while the benefits were substantial. (Secretary of
Defense Report, 1989, pp. B-ll-B-32) When this authority is carefully and
deliberately used in conjunction with an industry action plan or other industry
specific remedies, Buy American restrictions can have the positive effect of
protecting U.S. industry while enhancing its ability to compete in the future.
Future use of Buy American restrictions should be directed, deliberate, and
short term. They should be used carefully by the Executive Branch in situations
where a critical capability is in danger of being lost. BAA restrictions should be a
part of a broad plan to return the industry in question to a competive force in the
world market. The plan should establish a definite end time to prevent the
industry from becoming dependent on Government protection.
4. Public Scrutiny
It is often difficult for politicians and acquisition managers to justify the
expenditure of American tax dollars to support foreign industry and foreign jobs.
The American public is reluctant to hear that American products are not of
sufficient quality to equip our soldiers, sailors and airmen. The "Buy American"
argument plays well in the political forum, especially when elections draw near.
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Very few public officials want to be put in the unsavory position of explaining
why tax dollars are being spent overseas, while businesses and industry in the U.S.
are continually "downsizing."
F. MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF THE BUY AMERICAN
The difficulty in quantifying the benefits of the Buy American Act comes in
determining the likelihood that a surge production capability will be needed in the
event of a full mobilization. If such a likelihood could be fixed, we could then
determine the value of mamtaining a surge capability. Expected Benefits would be
reduced to the equation:
Expected Benefits =(Probability that a surge capability is needed) X (Value of capability if it is needed).
To solve for the lowest possible value of maintaining this surge capability,
we would find the point where Costs are equal to benefits:
Costs= (Probability that a surge capability is needed) X (Value of capability if it is needed)
Because the specific costs of the Buy American Act can't be isolated,
solving this equation becomes impossible.
Future attempts to measure the costs and benefits of the Buy American Act
should focus on establishing a more specific range of price increases directly
attributable to the BAA. Once these "costs" are established, a realistic probability
that a surge capacity is needed would assist in isolating the inherent value of
maintaining excess surge capacity.
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G. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
The Buy American Act is protectionism in its purest form. Its history
reveals that the original intent of the Act was to prevent foreign firms from
profiting on the expenditure of U.S. public funds. Politicians of the time were
explicit about the purpose of the law: They wanted to protect American jobs and
American firms from foreign competition.
Economic theory and empirical studies show us the devastating effects that
protectionist policies have on the domestic economy. Shielding domestic firms
from foreign competition results in marketplace inefficiencies and ultimately
results in uncompetitive domestic firms that produce inferior goods at higher
prices.
The 1994 analysis of Hufbauer and Elliot shows that erosion still occurs in
the protected industry, just at a slower pace. (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1994, p. 6)
The 1989 Secretary of Defense report indicates the same type of erosion is
occurring in our industrial base despite Government protection from international
competition. Shielding the domestic mobilization base from foreign competition
forestalls innovation and the need to modernize: "Buy American restrictions often
provides protection and guaranteed business to U.S. industry without a
corresponding incentive to modernize and become competitive on the world
market." (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 5) Domestic firms that are
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considered part of the defense industrial base are incentivized to hold onto excess
production capacity, which ensures high overhead rates and noncompetitive prices
for DoD.
Economic theory also illustrates the gains that could be achieved through
free and open competition. As trading partners lift restrictions, the forces of the
marketplace begin to direct manufacturing specialization, and comparative
advantages among trading partners begin to emerge. If such free trading were to
take place among allies, the whole alliance would benefit from the expanding
production possibilities. One additional benefit from free trading among allies
would be an inherent commonality in products manufactured by members of the
alliance, for the alliance. This type of commonality has been sought by NATO
since the 1970s, under its policy of Rationalization, Stabilization and
Interoperability (RSI).
As the U.S. DoD procurement budget remains low, we must continually
seek methods for spending our available resources effectively. Combining U.S.
procurement efforts with those of our NATO partners would surely begin to
stretch DoD's dollars. Allowing NATO partners to compete their new or existing
systems against our emerging technologies would encourage innovation and
modernization on both sides.
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H. CONCLUSION
While many current socio-economic programs associated with Government
procurement support viable objectives, the Buy American Act was initially
established on the flawed premise that protectionism would save American jobs.
The complete truth is that while some jobs are saved, others are lost, and the
customer bears the cost for supporting those jobs through higher prices. In the
end, the economy suffers as the consumer (in this case the Government) buys
fewer goods at higher prices.
A more formidable argument for mamtaining the Buy American Act is that
it protects the domestic industrial base's surge capability in case of a national
emergency. Issues of national security and maintaining the domestic industrial
base will keep protectionist practices alive in defense procurement policy. Buy
American restrictions can be effective when used deliberately and sparingly.
Targeting a specific industry for a designated period of time may be a effective
method of "protecting" domestic producers until they can regain their competitive
abilities. This type of "closed-end" protectionism could ensure that domestic
producers continually innovate to stay competitive on the world market.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal conclusions and recommendations drawn from this research
are presented below, followed by answers to research questions and topic areas
recommended for further research.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Buy American restrictions are a conglomeration of legislation that was
designed to protect and strengthen the defense industrial base. The laws have had
little positive impact. Protectionist legislation serves as a disincentive for domestic
producers, eliminating the need to modernize, innovate, and compete. The Act has
resulted in increased costs and increased procurement time, and has angered allies
who are upset by our closed markets. The Buy American Act has had the
following negative effects on Department of Defense purchases:
• Procurement and delivery delays when domestic products are not
available, requiring approval of a waiver and a new solicitation.
• Confusion and administrative delays due to the need for industry and
DoD to adjust to the requirements of the restriction.
• Cost increases for DoD procurements.
• Potential for protected industries to become dependent on DoD
procurements and fail to take measures necessary to restore their
competitive position in a free market environment.
• Potential duplication of investments already made by allied and
friendly nations, leading or contributing to excess production
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capacities (which may be beneficial for critical items during surge or
mobilization, but is expensive in peacetime).
• Impediments to technological cooperation with U.S. allies and to the
flow of modern technology to the United States.
• Resentment on the part of U.S. allies, which can lead to reciprocal
buy national measures or other retaliatory actions. (Secretary of
Defense Report, 1989, p. hi)
Because our national military strategy recognizes the necessity of U.S.
forces fighting as part of an international coalition, (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995, p.
8) the need to sustain a uniquely American industrial base for military goods has
become less critical. As we conduct more and more military operations with
international coalitions, the need for jointly-developed weapon systems that
enhance allied interoperability will become critical. Jointly developed weapon
systems could also help allies realize cost savings through economies of scale, i.e.
more production copies will lower individual unit costs. The declining defense
procurement budget does not afford us the luxury of sustaining a large, mostly-idle
production capability. The DoD pays for this excess capacity in high overhead
rates and noncompetitive prices. The U.S. and its allies should capitalize on this
era of coalitions, and pool their resources in order to efficiently update their
respective armed forces.
Thus far, any successful implementation of Buy American restrictions has
come at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Using authority granted by the
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National Security Act of 1947, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), the SECDEF has the ability to
protect industries that are vital to U.S. national security and the domestic
mobilization base. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. iv) When this authority
is used in conjunction with an industry action or other industry specific remedies,
Buy American restrictions can have the positive effect of protecting U.S. industry
while enhancing its ability to compete in the future.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress has often expressed its concern over the Defense industrial base
by protecting U.S. industry from worldwide competition. "Initiatives that enhance
the domestic and alliance defense industrial base—rather than encourage small,
protected national defense markets—are in the long-term best interest of the United
States." (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 12) Congress should take the
following actions to enhance the U.S. defense industrial base (Secretary of
Defense Report, 1989, pp. 12-13).
1. Abolish Most Congressionally Mandated Restrictions
Congress should not maintain a separate (and often counter-productive) set
of restrictions that coddle U.S. industry. Broad-based restrictions should be
abolished and replaced with specifically targeted and more effective methods that
assist U.S. industry on a case-by-case basis. The reduction of Buy American
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restrictions could be coordinated with trading partners (allies) to gain reciprocal
removal of similar buy-national restrictions, granting U.S. firms access to foreign
markets. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 12)
2. Avoid Future Use of Buy American Restrictions
"The Congress should avoid future use of Buy American restrictions in
Defense procurement." (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989, p. 12) If future
restrictions are considered, the Congress should:
• Identify and target nations with unfair trade practices, rather than
restrict products from all U.S. trading partners.
• Implement restrictions for a limited period of time (3 to 5 years),
rather than continuing protection indefinitely.
• Periodically review the effectiveness of the restrictions.
• Serve notice of intended restrictions and provide the opportunity for
all effected parties to comment. (Secretary of Defense Report, 1989,
p. 13)
3. Rely on OSD Authority
The Congress should strengthen laws that give the Secretary of Defense the
discretion to maintain the U.S. defense industrial base, and then monitor DoD's
use of that authority. "The Congress should support the Secretary of Defense in
developing an industrial base policy to resolve the problems of defense-critical
industries identified over the past decade, including steps to develop a better
process for identifying;
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1. The role of basic suppliers/industries and defense needs at the
supplier levels,
2. Domestic industry capacity to meet those needs, and
3. A policy framework to help those industries to become economically
self-sufficient competitive.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What are the origins of the Buy American Act?
The Buy American Act is rooted in the protectionist sentiment of the 1930s.
A growing isolationist philosophy and the economic hardships of the Great
Depression inflamed the popularity of protectionist practices. The Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act of 1930, which established the highest tariff levels in U.S. history,
paved the way for further restrictions on foreign trade, such as the Buy American
Act. The Act requires the procurement of American materials and manufactured
items for public use.
2. To what extent has the defense procurement budget declined?
In 1985, the DoD procurement budget was at a high of $123.7 Billion. It
has steadily decreased to a projected low of $36.8 Billion in 1998. The drop
represents a 70% decline in procurement funds over a thirteen-year period.
When procurement dollars are analyzed as a percentage of total DoD
spending, it becomes apparent that the DoD procurement budget has borne a
disproportionate amount of the total Defense budget reduction over the last
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thirteen years. The heavy cuts in procurement were intentional, as the DoD sought
to shield Operations and Maintenance funds (largely viewed as "readiness funds)"
from the drastic effects of the decline in the defense budget.
3. What are the measures of costs?
The best measures of increased costs associated with the Buy American Act
are the increased costs associated with a mandatory domestic preference, and the
number ofjobs that would be lost if the preference were removed.
• In the Machine Tool industry, protectionism results in an increase in
prices of roughly $385 million. If the preference were removed
1,534 jobs in the machine tool industry would be lost. This equates
to a cost of $250,978 per unemployed worker.
• In the Ball Bearing industry, protectionism results in an increase in
prices of roughly $51 million. If the preference were removed 146
jobs in the ball bearing industry would be lost. This equates to a
cost of $349,300 per unemployed worker.
• In the Mooring Chain market, the Buy American Act results in a
$6.8 million price increase for the Navy. If the preference were
removed 100 jobs in the chain industry would be lost. This equates
to a cost of $680,000 per unemployed worker.
The change in procurement lead times resulting from increased adminis-
trative burden to monitor compliance with the Buy American Act can also help us
measure the costs and benefits of this policy.
• In the Machine Tool Industry, the average delivery time rose to as
high as two years in 1980, compared with a two-month average
delivery schedule for foreign tool builders.
• In the domestic woolen market, production lead time increased from
180 days to 365 days.
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4. What are the measures of the benefits?
The Buy American Act protects a domestic surge capability in the event of
a threat to our National Security. The value of this mamtaining this capability is
difficult to quantify.
5. Do the benefits of the Buy American Act exceed its costs?
While a large body of research and economic theory supports the view that
protectionism (such as the Buy American Act) leads to unnecessarily high prices,
it is difficult to quantity the primary benefit of the Act which is: the value of
retaining a "warm" domestic production capability. The inability to determine the
value of such a capability makes a Cost-Benefit determination troublesome.
As our defense strategy embraces coalition-building and worldwide
consensus before undertaking military action, the need to sustain a uniquely
American industrial base for military goods appears to be less critical.
6. What aspects of the Buy American Act could be modified to
appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of maintaining the
policy?
Broad-based restrictions should be abolished and replaced with specifically
targeted and more effective methods that assist U.S. industry on a case by case
basis. The Congress should only use Buy American restrictions in defense
procurement only when;
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• Specific recovery goals for the industry are established, or
• Uncooperative trading partners are identified for retaliatory trade
restrictions.
The Congress should strengthen laws that give the Secretary of Defense the
discretion to maintain the U.S. defense industrial base, and then monitor DoD's
use of that authority.
7. Primary Research Question - What are the costs and benefits of
upholding the Buy American Act?
While the actual increases in costs for every industry are impossible to
derive, economic theory and empirical research on the costs of protection in the
United States show that trade restrictions do artificially raise prices in a protected
market. The restrictions also serve to stifle innovation and competitiveness in
protected domestic markets. In addition to these costs, other costs identified in
this analysis are:
• Redundant research and development projects among allies lead to
higher costs for everyone.
• The increased administrative burden of determining "foreign origin."
• Restrictions on trade invite retaliation from allies.
• Restrictions cause increases in production lead time due to
mandatory orders on an already incapable production base.
The primary benefit of the Buy American Act is the industrial base can retain a
surge capability in the interests of national security.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
• What lessons about Government subsidies can be learned from
France's support of Aerospatiale?
•
•
Will the EU adopt the Buy European Act as EU public procurement
policy?
How much should the Government incentivize producers for idle
production capacity?
Is the Secretary of Defense's authority over the industrial base
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